

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru¹

Series II, Volume 24

NEFA

1. Details of the NEFA Incident²

Before I read the statement³, Sir, may I suggest that we need not take too exaggerated a view of this incident, serious and' tragic as it was, and we need not imagine that any large upheaval anywhere has taken place? The facts I shall state presently when I read the statement.

The scene of this tragedy lies near the Subansiri river in the Subansiri district of the North East Frontier Agency. The facts in brief are that on the 22nd of October, 1953, a composite column of NEFA officials, Assam Rifles and a number of village headmen, accompanied by porters, arrived at Achingmori in the afternoon. The party consisted of Major R.D. Singh, accompanied by 22 other ranks of the Assam Rifles, one Area Superintendent, two Jamadars, two interpreters, 17 village headmen and 100 porters. The object of the party was to investigate into certain tribal feuds in this area and to distribute medicines, salt and other necessities among the tribesmen. The party found a campside cleared by the local tribesmen in this area with temporary bashas i.e., thatched huts constructed by them for the camp in an area of approximately looxl50

¹ Published by the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, Teen Murti House, New Delhi

² Statement in the House of the People, 21 November 1953. Parliamentary Debates (House of the People), Official Report, Vol. V, Pt.1, 16 November to 18 December \953, cols.249-256. Extracts

³ This statement was made in response to a point of order raised by Debeswar Sarmah, a Congress Member from Jorhat.

yards. All round this camp was a thick virgin forest. The Patrol Commander, Major R.D. Singh, interpreted this as a sign of friendliness on the part of the local tribesmen and did not consider it necessary to adopt the normal protective measures. The Area Superintendent's party started opening the medicine chests and issuing medicines, while one of the Jamadars started collecting the salt bags for issue to tribesmen. Just then about 10 Daflas-- that is the name of that particular tribe -- came to the camp and asked the sentry's permission to go inside the camp. The sentry in turn asked Major R.D. Singh who allowed their men to enter without taking the necessary precautions and disarming them. They were armed with dahs or swords, and as soon as they entered the camp, they killed the sentry. This was a signal for 400 or 500 Daflas, who had been hiding all round the camp in the jungle, armed with dahs, spears, bows and arrows. They rushed into the camp and killed the Area Superintendent and two other officials. Just then Major R.D. Singh rushed around to get the escort party together but in the process he himself was attacked and killed. According to reports received up to date, about 5 Assam Rifles men, 30 other tribesmen have been killed, making a total of about 40. The remaining 60 to 70 are reported to be held in detention by the Daflas. About half a dozen of them have since been released.

The first information regarding this incident reached Officer Commanding, Gusar Outpost, which is about four to five days' march from this place, on the 25th of October. He sent the information to Shillong and rushed half a platoon to try to rescue the others. They could not, however, proceed beyond the first stage because the cane bridge connecting the place had been destroyed by the Daflas.

On receipt of this information at Shillong, immediate steps were taken to reinforce the various outposts in the Subansiri and the Abor Hills districts

and additional Assam Rifles platoons were flown to various places. Indian Air Force were flown practically every day over the area to reconnoitre. The reason for the crime appears to be the traditional hostility between the Dafla tribes of the Tagin Area and the Abor tribes of the Abor Hills district. Formerly, the Daflas used to extort tributes and take slaves from the Abors. Since the extension of the administration to the Abor Hills district, these exactions were stopped. It is also possible that the Daflas of Tagin area may have resented the large number of Abor porters accompanying the party. The incident might have been averted if Major Singh had taken the necessary precautions, which are normally taken on such occasions. During the visits of two previous parties to this area there had been no such incident, because the necessary precautions had been taken.

It is difficult to get exact details of the incident and the real motive for this crime until peace and order have been restored in this area and the guilty have been brought to book. This will, naturally, take some time in view of the difficult terrain, the absence of any tracks, etc. It would have been easy enough for us to take punitive action against these simple, proud and virile people. We could have bombed their villages and killed a large number of their people. No great skill was needed for that, but we are treating the incident normally as we would treat a dacoity or a riot, the only difference being that it took place in somewhat unusual surroundings. The policy of our Government is not to strike terror or kill and destroy indiscriminately. We shall certainly restore peace and order in this area, bring to book the real offenders and ring leaders, but we do not wish to punish the innocent and the misguided. We are confident that we can have the friendship and respect of these simple folks by adopting a firm, clear and sympathetic policy towards them. By adopting a strong, dignified and imaginative policy we can win their esteem and affection. We have, therefore, warned them that if they do not surrender the hostages, arms and ammunition captured

by them by a certain date, action will be taken against them. Details are not yet available but information has been received that headmen of the Daflas living in the upper Tagin area have offered their services and cooperation to our outposts north of Achingmori. We expect our land forces to enter the affected area in the last week of this month and shall be in a position to give greater details after they have restored peace and order in the affected locality.

May I further explain that this area is a completely unadministered area? There had been no kind of administration there previously—in fact not only there, but in the adjoining districts as well. Our administration has gradually spread to the adjoining districts, though even they are hard and difficult of access, owing to lack of communications, and it takes some weeks to march there. In one or two places, some airstrips have been made, and so one can go there quickly — i.e., a few persons by air—but, normally, of course, people have to march long distances. In this particular distant area, surrounded by forests, there has been no experience thus far, for the people there, of an administration, and it is not very surprising that when they act in a manner which may not be easily understandable or very reasonable, one would not take it quite so seriously in their case, as one would in any other case. It is our intention, as soon as these persons have been adequately dealt with, and we have spread some simple form of administration there, to send some doctors, agricultural advisers etc.⁴ to these areas also...⁵

⁴ Major Kathing, a Naga officer, was deputed to the Tuensang area in December 1953 for tightening control. He undertook a tour in the area and recommended development programmes in Serna, Sangtam and Yimchunger areas. Accordingly in early 1954. the Government opened schools and dispensaries and upgraded the administrative post

⁵ H.N. Mukerjee asked Nehru whether he would state what measures had been proposed for the relief of economic distress in the area

I would gladly give as much information as I have. The honourable Member opposite refers to long terms measures. Long term measures are the measures we are taking in other districts of the North East Frontier Agency. The very first thing necessary is the building of roads and communications; otherwise, one cannot reach there or do anything. The second thing that we have done is giving some kind of medical" help and also making available agricultural advisers, and this is yielding results in these places. This particular incident has nothing to do with the measures we take or do not take. From the point of view of administrative purposes, it is a completely virgin area. As perhaps the House knows, I am a considerable admirer of these tribes of the North East Frontier. They are a fine lot of people. These Daflas, whom I have seen, are perhaps the most primitive of the people I have seen round about there. We treat them as one's children; we treat them firmly, if you like, but also gently and give them as much help as we can-medical, agricultural and other. Normally speaking, of course, nothing from outside has gone there; I mean to say, there they do not import or export; they live their own life in that restricted area and one does not want suddenly to change their way of life. That upsets them completely, but we must gradually help them to help themselves...

The fact that that place is not an administered area does not mean that it is outside-I am not talking about law, but of practice-the territory of the Indian Union. As a matter of fact, we are administering area beyond it, the border area that is administered. We have outposts and checkpoints beyond that. These are virgin forests in between and the question does not arise of their considering in a constitutional sense what their position is. I do not think they are acquainted with any Constitution.

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2. To Bisnuram Medhi⁶

New Delhi

December 3, 1953

My dear Medhi,

Sometime ago, the" President of the Assam Pradesh Congress Committee, Shri Bimalaprasad Chaliha, sent me a report of his visit to the Naga Hills.⁷ I suppose you have seen a copy of this report. I have found it very interesting. In this report he mentions that he was going to return to the Naga Hills.⁸ Did he go there again and, if so, did he give you any additional report?

I should like to have your comments on Chaliha's report. I should also like to know what, in your view, the position is in the Naga Hills. According to Chaliha's report, the administration hardly functions there, and the Nagas hold together completely.

Since you have changed your Deputy Commissioner there,⁹ what other developments, are taking place? Has the new Deputy Commissioner made good in any way or created a better impression? Have there been any aggressive or violent activities of the Nagas or any incidents?

Whatever might happen there, our policy will have to be a friendly one, though also a firm one. The friendly aspect should not be forgotten. At the

⁶ JN Collection. Copy was also sent to Jairamadas Doulatram

⁷ Chaliha undertook the tour on 18 September 1953 to study the Naga areas. He reported to Nehru: "you will agree with me that the situation in the Naga Hills is not only unhappy but quite stiff. It may need repeated efforts and months or may be years to improve the situation if it could be improved at all."

⁸ Chaliha undertook a second visit on 21 October 1953. He reported that the demand for independence was sincere and popular, though based more on sentiments rather than reason; that the civil administration in the area was weak and that creation of an alternative leadership was possible only if a scheme respecting the Naga sentiments could-be evolved.

⁹ S.N. Barkataki was replaced by S.J.D. Carvalho

same time, we must not appear to surrender. As we have stated previously, we are prepared to consider a large measure of autonomy for that area and noninterference with their local affairs. But we are not prepared to talk even on the basis of independence.¹⁰ These questions, however, do not arise at present. I think the best course will be to let them lie low and carry on the administration there quietly with as little interference as possible. We must remember that in fact the Nagas outside the Naga District, and more especially in Manipur, are, on the whole, cooperating with the Government there.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

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3. Policy Towards Tribal People¹¹

The letter from the Government of Assam to the Joint Secretary dated December 6, 1953, is interesting and poses a number of questions for our consideration.

2. I might state to begin with that, however much we may deplore the tragedy at Achingmori, there is nothing in it for us to blame the administration.

The Governor has rightly pointed out that, during the last five or six years, we have extended our administration over a large area quite peacefully and

¹⁰ Amrit Kaur during her tour of the area met the Naga leaders on 30 November 1953. She agreed to most of their demands except the demand relating to the question of independence. Bisnuram Medhi, too, declared on 2 December that he could not justify the demand for an independent Naga State, which he thought was being raised by a few misguided leaders

¹¹ Note to the Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Joint Secretary, MEA. 9 December 1953. JN Collection. Copy of the note was also sent to Jairamdas Daulatram

without a single incident. This is a very creditable record, considering the primitive people who live there and the terrain. It seems fairly clear that the person to blame for this incident was the unfortunate Major Singh, who himself became a casualty.

3. This confirms our opinion that it is most important for our officers there, both civil and military, to have special training for work in these areas. We are taking some steps to choose our civil officers carefully. The Military officers should also, as far as possible, participate in this training. I should like some arrangement for this to be made. It may not be possible for all of them to gather together for it, but they could take it in turns by attending the lectures etc. which are being arranged for the new civil officers.

4. It should be clearly understood that the views of the civil officer must prevail when any situation of difficulty arises.

5. It is also necessary that the Assam Rifles should be more closely associated in any work they do with the Civil Administration. How this should be done is a matter for consideration.

6. The whole problem of dealing with these tribal areas has to be thought out again by us. Generally speaking, I think we should interfere as little as possible with the tribal ways of life. The British Government pursued a wise policy in this respect, from a governmental point of view. Our outlook is completely different. But, if other considerations did not prevail, I would have advised our going slowly in establishing our administration in these areas. I do not think we need talk about extending the benefits of Welfare State. I have grave doubts myself as to how far we benefit these people by the apparatus of administration that we may set up there, and opinions

may well differ as to what a Welfare State is. These people presumably are more or less happy, and it is quite possible that our attempts to improve their lot might lead to greater unhappiness for them.

7. However, these conditions are rather beside the point because we have inevitably to look after our frontier and we cannot leave the intervening areas without some kind of an administration, communications etc. The compulsion of events forces us to go ahead. In doing so, however, we should pay particular attention to a policy of non-interference with tribal habits and ways of living. Our first step should be roads; second, dispensaries and the like and third, simple schooling. We should allow these to exercise their influence on the people without any compulsion. Once we go there, the process of change starts anyhow. We need not try to force the pace and thus probably break up the tribal structure, without giving anything else in its place.

8. The tribal people vary greatly and it is not wise to lump them together and to imagine that one policy will be suitable for all of them. We have, therefore, to study each tribe separately. But the general principles might well be the same.

9. We have had a good deal of trouble with the Nagas in the Naga hills. To call the Nagas primitive may be true to some extent, but it is not the entire truth, and, in a way it does not help. They are a tough and fine lot of people and we may carry on for a generation without solving the problem. We cannot and we must not adopt the old British method of armed suppression. That leaves us really the sole alternative of peacefully winning over in all friendliness, with punishment of the guilty. Even that punishment has to be judged by standards other than those that apply to the rest of

India. If a Naga head-hunter removes the scalp of a few persons, it is not much good treating him or his like as we would a murderer here.

10. One thing I should like to make perfectly clear again and that is there must on no account be forced labour.¹² There can be no excuse for this except on some occasion of grave emergency.

11. Generally speaking, our police or civil personnel should not spread out too much over these areas. They should remain at their specific posts and be specially told not to interfere except when absolutely necessary.

12. This incident at Achingmori and the steps we have taken subsequently might well be made into a course of study for our officers. This will give them some idea of the nature of the problems we have sometimes to face, the type of people we have to deal with, the consequences of lack of precautions and of over-confidence, and above all, the general attitude that we should take up towards the tribal people. It has always to be remembered that we have to win them over and not make them into bitter enemies. Also that they have a way of life of their own, which is (apart from some objectionable practices) a wholesome way and a different way from ours. We have no business to impose our ways or ourselves upon them.

13. I am sending a copy of this note direct to the Governor.

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¹² The Government of Assam had promulgated a regulation in the Naga Hills to requisition the services of porters in case of official need or emergency. The Nagas complained that under this pretext young Nagas were often forced to carry loads of military personnel and others.

24 December 1953

Mr. Chairman, I shall only endeavour to say a few words in regard to some of the points raised in the course of the debate.¹⁴ An honourable Member, Mr. C.G.K. Reddy, said many things which to some extent answer themselves, because he has the habit, in the course of a few sentences, of contradicting himself many times. It is not really necessary for me to add anything in reply to that bundle of contradictions, but I do wish to understand what is meant by the phrase "national foreign policy" which is being bandied about. I am all for a national foreign policy. I would gladly consult as many people and as many groups as possible and also the leaders of groups, whenever an opportunity arises. But first of all a national foreign policy must necessarily mean some measure of agreement on that policy, on the broad principles of that policy. Of course, consultations there may be. I find in the honourable Mr.Reddy's speech a very great gap between his way of thinking and mine on this question. Does a nation lie somewhere in between the honourable Mr.Reddy and myself, and where does it lie? Do we go half way or if I give up something...¹⁵

I wish to understand, because here, from the very speech that the honourable Mr.Reddy made, probably there is not much agreement on the national foreign policy. How does one get it? There are certain matters and

¹³ Reply to a debate in the Council of States, 24 December 1953. Parliamentary Debates (Council of States), Official Report, Vol. V, Nos. 18-25, 16 to 24 December 1953, cols. 3590-3599.

¹⁴ Nehru's speech while moving the motion on foreign affairs in the Council of States, is not printed. The speech was on the same lines he spoke in the House of the People on 23 December 1953.

¹⁵ C.G.K. Reddy interjected: "I do not ask him to consult me and I don't think he will condescend to do so."

certain emergencies when there is a large measure of agreement, because the smaller points are out of the way. That is true. I suppose personally, if I may say so, that the policy that the Government have been following by and large – I am not referring to details – is what I would call very much a national foreign policy, which, I do submit, has received a measure of support from the people of this country which hardly any country can show in regard to its foreign policy. However, we should remain in touch with others in regard to the leaders of other groups. I certainly welcome that, and, to some extent, I will try to give effect to that.

Then the honourable Mr. Reddy talked a great deal about something, about a wave of hysteria encouraged by me and my colleagues. In particular, he referred to some circular issued by – presumably he referred to – the All India Congress Committee.¹⁶ Now, I should have thought that the honourable Mr. Reddy perhaps is more excited about this matter than I am. Certainly, I am not and let there be no mistake about it. Far from hysteria, I deprecate hysteria at any time, but it is true that the All India Congress Committee issued some kind of a circular. I might confess here that I have not seen that circular, as yet. But, leaving that aside, the position is – not the wording of it – the idea of it was at my instance, I admit that. So far as I know, that circular contained some advice about holding meetings to consider this problem, not processions and the like – I am not a believer in processions – the whole point being that public opinion should be informed so that it may not merely go astray by listening to rumours and other things and it may be positively informed about the very important developments. That is the function of every intelligent party, to inform public opinion according to its own way of looking at things about these developments. It depends how that is done – it may do it the wrong way or

¹⁶ See ante, pp.

the right way. We happen to be a very live and dynamic party and we approach the public and don't sit at home.¹⁷

I hope so. I was not present at that meeting. I am told that it was a very good meeting and very good speeches were delivered. I was not present to here every word but my colleagues were there and they reported to me that it was one of the best meetings that Delhi had where speeches were moderate and very good.

He also said, I mean the honourable Mr. Reddy, I did not quite get his words – something about our Consul is Sinkiang being withdrawn. I don't quite know if the honourable Mr. Reddy knows anything about recent history. In fact some changes have taken place in the last two years. Some major changes have taken place there. As a result of those changes, which have nothing to do with India at the moment – leaving that out – internally there many things have happened. It is perfectly true our Consul went there – I speak from memory – probably in 1948, may be even later, in 1949. But when these changes, revolutionary changes took place there, it is perfectly true that the Chinese Government, when they came to Tibet, told us that they intended, that they wanted to treat Sinkiang as a closed area. They told other State Government, too. Well, nothing happened. Our Consul remained there. But because of those changes, because of many factors – among them being what happened in Kashmir – the trade ceased. Sinkiang was important to us, or rather Kashgar. Let us use the word Kashgar and not Sinkiang. Kashgar is important to us as a trade route. The trade went over the Karakoram, passed though Ladakh and Leh on to Kashmir. Various factors, including developments in Kashmir led to the stoppage of that trade. While on the one hand the Chinese Government said that they wanted to treat that area as a closed area and did not wish

¹⁷ C.G.K. Reddy here asked whether the meeting held in Delhi was in line with the advice that Nehru had given.

to encourage foreign missions there, on the other hand, this trade stopped. The result was, our Consul remained there for some time, till recently. But the Indian merchants there, the trade having stopped, gradually disappeared, and so far as I know there is hardly a single Indian merchant left there – may be there are one or two. And so our Consul said, “I am doing no work at all. There is now no work to be done.” So we advised him to come away and he did come away. There is some property, but that is not the point. But it is a fact that the Consul, if I may say so, ceased to function, particularly, if you like, because of certain developments in Tibet and, again if you like – because of the Chinese State absorbing Tibet practically, not merely theoretically. This question of Tibet was referred to, I believe by the honourable Dr. Kunzru also. Well, I do not know what was expected or what is expected of us to be done in Tibet – I would say with a certain acquaintance with the position of Tibet during the last, let us say, 50 or 60 years or so that at no stage in Tibet’s history, to my knowledge – and I have studied it fairly carefully – was the suzerainty of China denied. Sometimes some Tibetan groups denied it. But no foreign country at any time ever denied the suzerainty of China over Tibet over the last many, many generations. That is the position. There is no doubt about it. Some people want us to go out on a kind of crusade for the independence of Tibet or for proclaiming something which in international law, or in the position then existing, had not been put forward by anybody.¹⁸

We sent many notes – not one.¹⁹ We are constantly sending notes. What is

¹⁸ Devaprasad Ghosh interrupted to ask whether the Government of India had sent a note of protest to the Chinese Government.

¹⁹ When on 21 October 1950, the Government of India drew the attention of the Government of China to the harmful effects of the latter resorting to military action to “liberate” Tibet, as such action might lead to the postponement of the admission of the People’s Government of China to the United Nations and to unrest on India’s borders, it

the protest about? I don't know what he means by protest. We are sending many notes, but at no time did we in any way challenge the suzerainty of China there. We have not, because for the last so many years, when the British Government was here, they had recognized the suzerainty of China over Tibet. As long as 50 or 60 years back, when the British were rather dominant in Tibet, even in those days, and subsequently in 1911 or thereabout, when talks took place between the representatives of China, Tibet and India, even then the suzerainty of China was recognized. At every stage it was recognized. But the British Government in those days, and we subsequently for a short time, recognized the autonomy of Tibet under China. Now, if that was so, if it is the practical aspect of the question, it is not clear to me how we can go about intervening in Tibet either constitutionally or in any other way. I just do not understand.²⁰

I am not aware of the massing of troops across the border Perhaps the honourable Mr. Reddy has greater sources of knowledge. I really do not know. We have no such sources. I do not pretend to have complete knowledge of what is happening in every part of Tibet. It is difficult. We have not got our own representative nor do the newspapers report these things, so that it is difficult to know all about these things. Much of the news that is published in the papers comes from Kalimpong, and Kalimpong contains many people who send news which is of most unreliable variety. It is very frequently, I think, completely unreliable and such news should not be accepted at all. I cannot give any exact figures but I am quite sure in my mind that there is no massing of troops anywhere – North, South, West or

received a reply criticizing the Government of India" as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet."

²⁰ C.G.K. Reddy interrupted here: "Prime Minister himself had protested against the complete subjugation of Tibet and that some people had been talking about it. I only mentioned Tibet regarding the massing of troops across the border and asked him whether it was not a geographical compulsion.

East – anywhere. In fact, my own information is that such troops as were there have been lessened for the simple reason that it is very difficult to feed them. Tibet is a most inhospitable country and is a most difficult country to live in, to cross over, to travel over – for anything.²¹

Tibet is part of the Chinese State and the Chinese State can send its troops anywhere it likes within its boundaries. The honourable Member seems to live in a world which has no relation to reality of today. I just do not understand this question. People talk about foreign policy. Let us know something, the A B C about these things.

The honourable Member asks if China has got troops in Tibet. Of course, China has kept troops there. Certainly they have troops there. I was telling you that actually, so far as my knowledge goes – it is not absolutely accurate as far as the numbers are concerned – the number of troops they had there originally had to be lessened; troops had to be withdrawn because of difficulties of feeding them there. The troops had to be fed and they could not be fed from the soil. Partly the feed had to come from China and it is very difficult to sent food across the Gobi desert and through a good bit of China.

I have no doubt – again I cannot give exact information, but I have no doubt – that airfields are being constructed in other parts of Tibet. It is a very natural thing to construct airfields. You may not like it. You may be slighted as far as that is concerned – it is another matter - but the only way of getting across to Tibet, as is the only way of getting across to many of our North Eastern Frontier areas, is by air. Air traffic has got to be developed. We are building airfields in most of our North-Eastern Frontier areas wherever we can and we are getting helicopters to go there. That is the only way.

²¹ Deveprasad Ghosh asked whether Tibet was still under effective Chinese occupation.

The airfields can be used naturally for offensive purposes as well as for defensive purposes and also for trade and for normal traffic. All these things may happen. I am no prophet and I cannot see into the future as to how airfields can be used but if there is any suspicion that there are some preparations being made in Tibet for some kind of invasion of India, some kind of attack on India, I think that is completely mistaken and I think there is no basis for it. I cannot say what the distant future may hold, but I do not hold from my own point of view, and practically I am voicing the opinion of many others, that there is the least chance of even an attempt at such an invasion of India, and I think, apart from any uncertain factors, the mere factors of geography and various other factors make that exceedingly difficult, and then, in the final analysis, if any such thing takes place, we shall resist it. Why shout about it and why get afraid of it? I do not understand this outlook. But, whatever may happen in the rest of the world, war or no war, this question of our Himalayan border being crossed is exceedingly unlikely. If something happens and an aeroplane comes and throws an atomic weapon on us, well, that depends on our policy rather than on anything else, on our friendship or hostility to other countries not other factors. Nobody can gamble with the future. But our relations with the Chinese State at the present moment are friendly. We do not agree with them in many matters and they do not agree with us on many matters, but our relations are friendly, and in the course of the next few days, possibly within the next week, talks will begin in Peking. These talks relate chiefly to certain special rights that have developed in the way of trade, etc., the pilgrimage that we have developed and some things relating to posts and telegraphs. Not one of them really is of vital importance. I think the honourable Dr. Kunzru mentioned the question of the frontier. So far as we are concerned no question about our frontier arises and we have nothing to do with it. We have got a frontier which we know well, which is

marked there and there the matter ends. We are not going to discuss it with anybody and we do not propose to admit anybody's right to come across that frontier except in a friendly way.²²

Nepal, the honourable Member knows, is an independent country and I cannot supply information about it except to say that we have an Ambassador there and some other people there helping the Nepal Government. Some officers are lent. We have got at present a small number of our troops to train their air force, about a couple of a hundred, I think. I cannot give you exact information, but, broadly speaking, politically, Nepal has been, in the last few months, in a somewhat fluid state, not in a very satisfactory state, and we have always had difficulties to face. We do not wish to intervene in the affairs, at the same time we are very much concerned of course with the stability and peaceful progress of Nepal and we have given advice from time to time when asked for. We have offered our help in the shape of experienced officers, though not many. A few have gone. The King of Nepal meanwhile fell seriously ill and the King was advised to go to Switzerland for treatment. He went there. He is much better now. He is convalescing and it is possible that he may be back within the next ten days or may be a fortnight. I hope that on his return we will see some further developments there towards stability. But the point of the honourable Dr. Kunzru was probably in reference to the stories about infiltration from Tibet, etc. I cannot give any precise answer to that. All I can say is that if there is any, it can be only on a small scale. It is nothing. It is nothing. It is not on a big scale. Obviously, I cannot say whether a few persons have come across – what they do in more or less unknown territory across the border – but it is not, to my knowledge on any substantial scale.

²² H.N.Kunzru said that he asked for information about Nepal and not about the North Eastern frontier.

That is all I have to say. I do not wish to take up more of the time of the House except to express my gratification at the general way honourable Members have expressed themselves and especially the hope they have expressed that if new difficulties come to us we shall face them with unity and courage.