

# Foreign Relations of the United States

## Eisenhower Administration

1955–1957

### Volume III, China

#### **219. Letter From President Chiang Kai-shek to President Eisenhower**

*Taipei , December 11, 1956.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am asking my Foreign Minister, Dr. George K. C. Yeh, who is proceeding to the United States to attend the current session of the United Nations General Assembly, to extend to you in person my sincere felicitations on your re-election to the Presidency of the United States, and to present this personal letter from me, which contains some of my thoughts on the current world situation for your consideration. Your re-election is a blessing not only to the American people and the cause of Sino-American friendship, but also to the future of mankind.

...Today, the inherent weaknesses of Communism are already beginning to manifest themselves as serious upheaval and unrest becomes widespread in all areas under Communist control. This might well be a turning point if the free world could take advantage of this favorable development by puncturing the Iron Curtain at its most vulnerable spots in Europe and in Asia. Once the Iron Curtain is punctured, the enslaved peoples behind it will rise in revolt against the Communist tyranny. Confronted with pressure both from within and without, Soviet Russia and its puppet regime in Peiping will be denied the advantage of massing their total strength for repression at home or aggression abroad. I feel that effective measures should be taken to carry out this positive strategy. If, on the contrary, we fail to heed the anguished appeals of the enslaved peoples, we would only prolong and intensify their

sufferings while causing them to lose faith in the eventual triumph of freedom over slavery. The tragedy of the recent abortive anti-Communist uprisings in Poland, Hungary, and in Tibet and Sinkiang should be taken as a bitter lesson for the democracies.

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Sincerely yours,  
Chiang Kai-shek

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**232. Memorandum From Robert McClintock of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie)**

*Washington , February 8, 1957.*

- SUBJECT
- Admission of China to the United Nations; Eventual Recognition by the United States.

I am much troubled by our attitude toward mainland China, although I am prepared to agree with much of our official doctrine on the perfidy of the Chinese Communists and their general inimical attitude. A large number of our allies and practically all of the so-called uncommitted governments do not share our views. The time is inevitably coming when the government in Peking by a purely procedural vote of the General Assembly will be seated in the United Nations as being directly representative of the people of China, and when that time comes whoever is the American Secretary of State (and possibly the head of the Policy Planning Staff with him) is going to be hauled over the coals by certain powerful elements of American public opinion.

...

It seems to me that before the Bandung powers and certain of our own allies vote mainland China into the United Nations, we might seek to extract such diplomatic advantage from an untenable situation as can be found. At this late date the chief benefit we possibly can derive by negotiation would be to secure effective guarantees that only a peaceful solution of the Taiwan problem shall be resorted to by either side. We might likewise secure at least a public pledge possibly backed by UN guarantees (and in this India would primarily be interested), that China would not seek to change its frontier, nor would it aid limitrophe nations in changing their frontiers, by force. This would have immediate application in North Korea, North Vietnam, Burma and Laos with a more residual application in Tibet and Nepal. Such a negotiation could at a minimum be based on assurance by the United States that it would withdraw its present adamant opposition to the entry of Communist China into the UN, even though if for purposes of the record we might not vote in favor of such admission. If the bargaining got more sticky we might contemplate raising the ante to include recognition.

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**264. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clough) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)**

*Washington , June 20, 1957.*

- SUBJECT
- Mao Tse-tung's Speech of February 27 "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People"

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5. Mao also admits to difficulties in Tibet. Conditions there, he says, are not yet “ripe” for the carrying out of “democratic reforms”. This can be done “only when the great majority of the people of Tibet and their leading public figures consider it practicable”. Mao goes on to say that it has been decided not to proceed with democratic reform in Tibet during the period of the second five-year plan (1958–1962). Whether it will be done during the third five-year plan will depend, he says, on the situation at the time.

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## **265. Memorandum of Discussion at the 327th Meeting of the National Security Council**

*Washington , June 20, 1957*

Present at the 327th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Under Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; etc...

### 2. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows discussion of a report by a United Nations committee on the Hungarian uprisings.]

Mr. Dulles pointed out that at long last Mao Tse-tung’s speech of February 1957 had been released by Peiping in the official version. It had likewise been published in *Pravda* today. While the official text had been doctored, it still contained many of the most significant points covered in the earlier texts of what Mao had said. After describing some of these points, Mr. Dulles prophesied that the speech would constitute the ideological basis for the Government of Communist China for some time to come. Moreover, the

speech certainly indicated differing trends in Communist China and in the USSR.

Mr. Dulles also noted a withdrawal of significant numbers of Chinese Communist troops from Tibet. He believed that these troops were being withdrawn in the face of Tibetan-inspired difficulties, on the one hand, and for reasons of economy, on the other. The Chinese Communists would presumably attempt to win the allegiance of Tibetans by different methods than the military methods of the past.

The President inquired whether the stationing of Chinese Communist troops in Tibet had not been considered a means of maintaining pressure on India. Mr. Dulles replied that this was certainly a consideration in the deployment of Chinese Communist forces in Tibet.

[Here follows discussion of developments in Indonesia, Thailand, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Yemen.]

S. Everett Gleason

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## **268. Address by the Secretary of State**

*San Francisco , June 28, 1957, 10:30 a.m.*

### **OUR POLICIES TOWARD COMMUNISM IN CHINA**

#### **I. The Situation Today**

On the China mainland 600,000,000 people are ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. That Party came to power by violence and, so far, has lived by violence.

It retains power not by will of the Chinese people, but by massive, forcible repression. It fought the United Nations in Korea, it supported the Communist war in Indochina; it took Tibet by force. It fomented the Communist Huk rebellion in the Philippines and the Communists' insurrection

in Malaya. It does not disguise its expansionist ambitions. It is bitterly hateful of the United States, which it considers a principal obstacle in the way of its path of conquest.

In the face of this condition the United States has supported; morally and materially, the free nations of the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia. Our security treaties make clear that the violation of these nations by International Communism would be considered as endangering our own peace and safety, and that we would act accordingly.

Together we constitute a goodly company and a stout bulwark against aggression.

As regards China, we have abstained from any act to encourage the Communist regime, morally, politically, or materially. Thus:

- We have not extended diplomatic recognition to the Chinese Communist regime;
- We have opposed its seating in the United Nations;
- We have not traded with Communist China, or sanctioned cultural interchanges with it.

These have been, and are, our policies. Like all our policies, they are under periodic review.

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The Republic of China is entitled to a permanent seat and "veto power" in the Security Council. Should a regime which in seven years has promoted 5 foreign or civil wars—Korea, Indochina, Tibet, the Philippines, and Malaya; which itself has fought the United Nations and has been found by it to be an aggressor; which defies the United Nations' decision to reunify Korea, and which openly proclaims its continuing purpose to use force—should that regime be given a permanent seat, with veto power, in the body which under the Charter has "primary responsibility for the maintaining of international peace and security"?

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**272. Memorandum From the Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence (Arneson) to the Secretary of State**

*Washington , July 17, 1957.*

- SUBJECT
- Intelligence Note: Chinese Communists Answer Secretary's 28 June Speech

Chang Han-fu's speech concentrated on what the Chinese Communists probably consider the Secretary's main arguments against US recognition of Peiping: the record of aggression, the value of US recognition in relation to Peiping's ambitions in Southeast Asia, and the stability of the Peiping regime. Chang charged that the US, not Communist China, was guilty of successive armed aggression. The Korean hostilities and uprisings in Tibet, he charged, were fomented by the US. He claimed that it was not within US power to bar Peiping's contacts with other countries and that the trade embargo actually helped Communist China by bringing about "economic independence" and greater cooperation within the bloc while it harmed the relations between the US and its allies. Chang rejected the notion that criticism by the "rightists" is connected with the regime's stability.

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**284. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of Korea (Dowling) to the Department of State**

*Seoul , September 16, 1957—5 p.m.*

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"Since last autumn, President Chiang continued, anti-Communist movements have developed in Sinkiang, Tibet, and Mongolia. The GRC had kept vigilant watch over these developments but the rest of the world had paid little attention. Now, since May, these anti-Communist movements had become almost faits accomplis and had forced the Communists to take drastic action. "The '100 flowers' and the 'rectification' programs were results of these developments. The US should now reappraise its China policy and should take account particularly of the psychological aspect, since these captive peoples look upon the US as the leader of the free world and as their ultimate liberator. He hoped the US realized the opportunities which now present themselves, however challenging they may be, and appreciated the serious repercussions for the GRC and the US if we let this movement die down.

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### **305. Paper Prepared by Robert McClintock of the Policy Planning Staff**

*[Washington,] December 31, 1957.*

- SUBJECT
- *Review of U.S. China Policy: A Pacific Settlement?*

F. Tibet would be neutralized, its independence and territorial integrity guaranteed by the limitrophe states, the USSR, China, India and Nepal. Simultaneously, Chinese troops would be withdrawn from Tibet. Tibet, if it desired, would be admitted to the UN.

G. The People's Republic of China would be recognized by the other signatory powers and reciprocally Peking would recognize the signatory powers not previously represented in that capital. Provisions here would be

included, if still necessary, for the safe return of U.S. nationals held in Chinese prisons, and safeguards would be provided for the preservation of the liberties of American citizens in China similar to those undertaken by the Soviet Union in the Roosevelt–Litvinov exchange of notes of November 16, 1933.

H. A general pact for peace in the Pacific would:

- Renounce any use of force in the settlement of disputes, although preserving the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
- Specifically undertake not to modify frontiers except by peaceful means.
- Guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and neutralization of Taiwan, Korea, Viet-Nam and Tibet.
- Provide for participation by the People's Republic of China in UN work on international disarmament.
- The signatories would be the People's Republic of China, the USSR, United States, Japan, India, United Kingdom, the limitrophe countries of Mainland China, including Nepal, Burma, Thailand and Laos; the so-called uncommitted countries of the area, including Cambodia, Indonesia and Malaya; and other interested Pacific powers, including the Philippines, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The countries whose unification, independence and integrity is to be guaranteed along with neutralization—Korea, Taiwan, Viet-Nam and Tibet—would likewise be signatories at interest.

I. Critique of Proposed Settlement

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As indicated above, the foregoing is a maximum settlement. It is not at present within the realm of practical achievement. It is obvious that neither Syngman Rhee in Korea, Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, or Ngo Dinh Diem in

Viet-Nam (to say nothing of Ho Chi Minh in the North), would under present circumstances agree to renounce their imagined opportunities for settlement wholly on their own terms. However, as repeatedly stressed in this paper, time is drawing very short for many of these protagonists on the Pacific stage.

a. *PRC may choose to wait.*

A more serious criticism of the proposed maximum settlement is the fact that the People's Republic of China may now feel that if, according to the evidence available to it, its admission to the United Nations is already assured, there is no real need to make concessions now to expedite the achievement of the inevitable. Furthermore, the People's Republic of China has consistently resisted any claim that Taiwan should not be considered as an integral part of Mainland China. Again, on its assessment of the evidence Peking may have concluded that the tenure of the Nationalists on Taiwan is brief and that all Mainland China need do is wait for the death of Chiang Kai-shek and the superannuation of his forces. The PRC may therefore refuse to consider the so-called "two China" concept. The Government in Peking similarly might prefer to take its chances of reunifying Korea and Viet-Nam on Communist terms, or, failing that, to maintain the present stalemate of divided regimes in both Korea and Viet-Nam. In Peking the giving up of suzerainty over Tibet might imply considerable loss of face. Peking thus far has resisted any proposal that it renounce the use of force in settlement of disputes and might prefer not to tie its hands in the future, particularly if it envisages the necessity of moving against the rice-bowl countries to the south and west.